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1. Introduction 
The recent U.S. subprime crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis have had 
adverse consequences for sovereign borrowers around the world. Spreads on credit default 
swaps (CDS) written on sovereign names rose sharply and simultaneously, especially at the 
time of the Lehman default in September 2008 and again during the height of the Eurozone 
debt crisis in late 2011. This study seeks to examine the risk transmission mechanisms by 
which such credit crises spread to sovereign borrowers around the world. To do so, we 
distinguish between the “fast-and-furious” contagion mechanism and the “slow-burn” risk 
spillover mechanism, to use the adjectives applied by Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2003) 
to contagion and protracted spillover effects.  
The literature distinguishes between two types of cross-border propagation of financial crises 
which are consistent with these two risk transmission mechanisms. Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002) see a contagion mechanism in which the realization of a shock to one country triggers 
a cascade of adverse reactions in other countries. Alternatively, Adrian and Brunnermeir 
(2011) and Ang and Longstaff (2013) amongst others focus on the contemporaneous effects 
across countries in response to major common shocks which lead to systemic risks. Bekaert 
et al. (2014) associate both mechanisms with financial crises. In this paper we examine both 
of these channels, using sovereign credit events to analyze the contagion channel and factor 
analysis to analyze the common shock channel. The latter leads to a risk spillover 
interpretation as we show that common risk factors load significantly on country-specific 
sovereign credit events and the effects were magnified during the European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis.  
The growing empirical literature on the determinants of sovereign credit spreads suggests that 
after controlling for common global shocks, sovereign default risk is related to country 
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fundamentals (Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010; Chiarella et al., 2015). It has been recognized 
that adverse economic fundamentals in individual countries have played a significant role 
during the European sovereign debt crisis (Caceres et al., 2010; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 
2012; Mink and De Haan, 2013) and this has been referred to as “wake up calls” or 
fundamental contagion. However, recent research also supports a role for regional contagion 
or cross-country links that are somewhat divorced from country-specific fundamentals. Such 
contagion seems to stem in part from correlated investor sentiment across the Eurozone 
(Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013; Beetsma et al., 2013; Chiarella et al., 2015; De Grauwe and Ji, 
2013). Aizenman, Hutchison and Jinjarak (2013), De Grauwe and Ji (2013) and Fuertes, 
Kalotychou and Saka (2015) show that in 2010 Eurozone periphery CDS spreads were higher 
than those of non-Euro countries with similar fundamentals, suggesting a role for contagious 
pessimism and self-fulfilling dynamics of panic and fear leading to the European sovereign 
debt crisis. Aizenman, Hutchison and Jinjarak (2013) provides as an alternative explanation 
based on the effect of expectations on future fundamentals, which were expected to worsen 
due to the adjustment challenges faced. In another vein, Dieckmann and Plank (2012) and 
Brutti and Saure (2015) document risk transfers due to the exposures of national banking 
sectors to bad credit stemming from the US sub-prime and European sovereign debt sectors 
and the widespread expectation of government bailouts across multiple countries. 
A parallel literature argues that sovereign credit spreads exhibit a strong degree of 
commonality that is unrelated to correlations in fundamentals. Instead the commonality can 
be traced to global financial market factors (for example, Ang and Longstaff, 2013; Geyer, 
Kossmeier and Pichler, 2004; Longstaff et al., 2011; Dieckmann and Plank, 2012; Mauro, 
Sussman and Yafeh, 2002). In particular, Longstaff et al. (2011) show that sovereign CDS 
spreads are explained and predicted by US equity returns, equity market implied volatilities 
and bond market risk premia. Remolona, Scatigna and Wu (2008) and Chiarella et al. (2015) 
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decompose the pricing of sovereign CDS contracts into what is attributed to fundamentals 
and what is due to non-fundamental forces like investor risk aversion and price momentum, 
with the latter components consistently accounting for the larger part of CDS spreads. 
Nonetheless, much of the focus in the literature has been on finding the determinants that 
explain credit spreads at the country level but not on the common pricing kernel for sovereign 
credit risks.  
Our study speaks to the literature on cross-border sovereign risk propagation by exploring 
both the time dimension and the cross-country dimension of this phenomenon. We 
investigate the time dimension by distinguishing between “fast-and-furious” contagion and 
the subsequent “slow-burn” spillover effects that are found to arise from increasing common 
risks. We explore the cross-country dimension by distinguishing between regional risk 
propagation and global risk propagation. Furthermore, we investigate the driving forces 
behind these two major risk transmission channels in the international sovereign debt market. 
To this end, we first use an event study approach to investigate the immediate impact of 
important sovereign credit events on other sovereign borrowers as reflected in extraordinary 
jumps in CDS spreads.1 This immediate impact is what we call “fast-and-furious” contagion.2 
We specifically examine the geographical reach of such contagion over our sample period. 
Does it tend to be contained within the region where the shock first occurs or does it often 
have widespread global consequences? 
1 In recent work on measuring systemic risk within financial systems, Rodriguez-Moreno and Peria (2013) 
compare two groups of macro-based and micro-based measures and for both groups they find that measures 
based on market-determined credit default swap (CDS) spreads performed better and are more straightforward 
to use than alternative measures.  
2 There is a vast literature linking the financial crises that occurred in the 1990s and early 2000s to past episodes 
of financial contagion. See for example, Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003), Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (2000) and Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2003). 
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Second, we extract multiple global sovereign risk factors from the variance structure of CDS 
spread movements and estimate a multi-factor pricing model for our sample of 67 sovereign 
borrowers from five geographical regions around the world. The effect of credit events on 
individual sovereign spreads through the common global risk factors and regional risk factors 
is what we collectively interpret as “slow-burn” risk spillover effects. According to 
Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2003), these credit events pose shocks that may have gradual 
and protracted manifestations in the build-up of shared risks that could cumulatively impose 
major economic consequences. It is important to have an improved understanding of these 
risk transmission channels underpinning sovereign credit contagion. 
Our analytical framework facilitates the testing of three related hypotheses. First, we 
hypothesise that contagion in the international sovereign debt market has an important 
geographical bias in that the effects are significantly more intense within regions than 
globally. This explains why De Grauwe and Ji (2013) find geographic clustering in spread 
changes that cannot be fully explained by fundamentals. The second hypothesis is that these 
region-specific episodes of sovereign credit contagion serve to gradually heighten global and 
regional risks. Third, these risk spillover effects can be reinforced by deteriorating economic 
fundamentals and/or global financial market forces.  
Using a global sample of daily sovereign CDS spreads over 2002 to 2013, we find strong 
evidence of intra-regional credit contagion stemming from specific sovereign credit events. 
Occasionally credit events do lead to global contagion but “fast and furious” contagion 
appears to be by and large, a regional phenomenon. We find these episodes of regional 
contagion to be concentrated during 2002-2003 in Latin America with the onset of the 
Argentinian debt crisis and at the height of the more recent Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. 
The common global risk factors all increased progressively leading up to the European debt 
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crisis coinciding with the increased sovereign credit contagion. This is consistent with a 
mechanism for global spillover effects or common clustering of shocks, which escalates 
systematic sovereign credit risk. 
We find that the global risk factors are predominantly driven by variables that tend to reflect 
global investor risk appetites and global indebtedness. On the other hand, the regional risk 
factors depend more on the fundamentals of all countries within the region. A deterioration in 
economic fundamentals captured by rising debt to GDP levels and downgrades in sovereign 
credit ratings increase regional sovereign credit risks.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sovereign CDS 
data used.  Section 3 introduces our methodological framework whilst Section 4 discusses the 
nature of sovereign credit contagion. Finally, Section 5 provides concluding remarks and 
some policy implications. 
 
2. Data 
The credit default swap (CDS) data used in this study are sourced from the Markit database.3 
Specifically, they are daily closing CDS spreads (ask prices) on five-year CDS contracts for 
67 sovereign borrowers in five geographical regions. We use CDS spreads from the 5-year 
maturity segment as this is deemed to be the most actively traded of all maturities (Pan and 
Singleton, 2008). The sample of sovereigns is shown in Appendix Table A. All spreads are 
expressed in basis points and are notionally denominated in US dollars. The period studied 
spans January 2002 to March 2013, providing a maximum of 173490 country-day 
observations.  This is the longest time period for which we have CDS data for a large cross-
3 Markit provides the longest history and best country coverage for sovereign CDS spreads. Another data source 
for sovereign CDS spreads is Thomson Reuters but these are available for a much shorter time period. We find a 
large correspondence in the brief time period over which the two data sources overlap.  
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section of countries. According to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA, 2013), the top 9 gross positions held in the CDS markets amounted to US$12.5 
trillion, and were all referenced on sovereign names, with four of them coming from the 
European Union (Italy, Spain, France, Germany). 
In Table 1, Panel A reports the summary statistics for the daily spreads, whilst Panel B 
reports the same for daily changes in spreads.  In Panel A, the average spreads over the 
sample period vary widely across sovereign obligors. These averages range from 379 basis 
points (bps) for Latin America (LA), 197 bps for Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 172 
bps for Eastern Europe (EEU), 152 bps for the Asia-Pacific (AP) and 110 bps for the rest of 
Europe (EU). Latin America has the highest mean and standard deviation of spreads (728 
bps) reflecting the chequered debt history of this region and especially the effects of the 
Argentinean debt crises in the 1990s and early 2000s. On the other hand, continental Europe 
exhibits the narrowest average daily spreads for the entire sample period. The standard 
deviation in European CDS spreads of 471 bps shows considerable volatility but this is 
mainly due to the turmoil in the last few years of the sample period. 
For investment horizons that are shorter than maturity, returns to CDS contracts are 
proportional to changes in spreads (but with the opposite sign). Hence, our analysis will be 
based largely on these spread changes. When it comes to daily changes in spreads, the full-
sample averages are small. Panel B shows a relatively large average for Western Europe, with 
a mean daily spread change of 0.56 bps, indicating a valuation loss. These spread changes 
however, have been quite volatile, with a standard deviation of 60.68 bps. The Asia-Pacific 
and MENA regions saw small average daily reductions in spreads and experienced relatively 
low volatility in spread changes (with standard deviations of 16.64 and 9.31 bps, 
respectively). Eastern Europe experienced a mean spread increase of 0.0054 bps but the 
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volatility has been relatively low with a standard deviation of 14.86 bps. At the lower tail of 
the return distribution, exposures to sovereign borrowers in Latin America have suffered the 
heaviest losses, with a CDS spread change of 254.49 bps at the 99.9% quantile. This reflected 
the disruptive Argentinian crisis in 2002. The second largest losses at the 99.9% quantile has 
been experienced in Western Europe with a CDS spread change of 227.68 bps. The smallest 
tail loss has been for Eastern Europe, with a spread change of 106.6 bps at the 99.9% 
quantile. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
3. Empirical Methodology 
Our empirical analysis of systemic risk in the international sovereign debt market is divided 
into two main parts. The first part focuses on measuring the geographical extent of “fast-and-
furious” contagion and determining whether it tends to be regional or global in nature. The 
second part focuses on measuring “slow-burn” global spillover effects. 
  
3.1  Measuring “fast-and-furious” contagion 
We measure the geographical extent of contagion using an event study approach. First, we 
identify sovereign credit events in each of our five geographical regions (outside of North 
America).4 We follow the approach of Jorion and Zhang (2007), who measure contagion in 
the US corporate debt market by relying on extreme jumps in CDS spreads to identify credit 
events. In our case, we define a regional sovereign credit event as the case where 
∆Sit  ≥ k     (1) 
4 We do not investigate sovereign credit events emanating in the U.S. as our period of analysis includes the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the inclusion of these credit events are likely to bias our findings on systemic 
sovereign risks.  
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where ∆Sit  is the one-day change in the CDS spread for sovereign i from day t-1 to day t, and 
the threshold k is the 99.9% region-specific upper quantile of the historical daily sovereign 
CDS spread change distribution reported in Table 1. We detect extreme sovereign CDS 
spread movements relative to other countries in the region as there are large variations in the 
magnitude of jumps at the 99.9 percentile observed across regions in Table 1. For this reason, 
we do not use global nor arbitrary region-specific thresholds to detect credit events. This 
strategy is also consistent with past financial crises being largely regional in scope and 
contained in East Asia, Latin America and more recently Europe. To pinpoint the exact onset 
of a given credit event, all consecutive events within each region are identified but only the 
first observation within a 5-trading-day window is kept. This approach identifies 89 credit 
events, arising from 20 individual countries over the 2002-2013 sample period.  
Having identified the events, we construct for each event two sovereign credit portfolios, a 
regional portfolio and a global one. The regional portfolio is an equally weighted portfolio of 
CDS contracts for all the sovereign borrowers in the region in which the event took place 
(excluding the event country). The global portfolio is an equally weighted portfolio of CDS 
contracts for the United States and all the other sovereign borrowers in the four regions 
outside the one in which the event took place. We then measure CDS portfolio returns for 
various narrow time windows around each event. We look at the one-day return on each 
portfolio for each day starting with the second day before the event and ending with the 
second day after the event and also multi-day cumulative portfolio returns within this 5-day 
window of each credit event.   
In the case of the regional portfolio, for each day t in the event window [t1, t2] we construct 
the cross-sectional Average CDS Spread Change Index (ACDXC) as 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 1𝑁𝑁 ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡    (2) 
10 
 
where CDXC is the change in the regional CDS portfolio spread and N = 89 credit events. 
We then compute the Cumulative Average CDXC (CACDXC) over the event window as 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴[𝑡𝑡1, 𝑡𝑡2] = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡2𝑡𝑡1 𝑡𝑡   (3) 
In order to circumvent biases in the variance estimation caused by ignoring cross-section-
dependence we adopt the portfolio time series approach advocated by Brown and Warner 
(1980). Thus, we control for cross-sectional dependence induced by possible event clustering 
by computing the variance of the average CDS spread change across events, 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴0), 
over the 60-day pre-event window [-70, -11]. In this framework, the event-day corrected (for 
cross-sectional dependence) t-statistic is 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡
�𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴0),   t = -2,…,0….,2     (4) 
and the corresponding t-statistic for the Cumulative Average CDXC over [t1, t2] is  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴[𝑡𝑡1,𝑡𝑡2]
�(𝑡𝑡2−𝑡𝑡1+1)𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴0)        (5) 
Similarly, to assess the international reach of regional sovereign credit events we evaluate of 
the effects on the global portfolio around each sovereign credit event by conducting the above 
calculation using changes in CDS spreads for the United States and for other sovereign 
borrowers in regions outside that of the credit event. We also report measures of regional 
responses that are adjusted for global credit risk levels by computing the risk-adjusted spread 
change of each sovereign in excess of spread changes in the global CDS portfolio (as defined 
for the global contagion analysis).  
 
3.2  Measuring “slow-burn” spillover effects 
The second part of our analysis focuses on measuring spillover effects across international 
debt markets. We first extract multiple underlying common global risk factors based on a 
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generalized principal component analysis (PCA) of the panel of sovereign CDS spreads.5 
Then we estimate a multifactor asset pricing model for the whole cross-section of sovereigns 
in our sample and treat the residuals as country-specific idiosyncratic risks.  These country-
specific risks are those that are not explained by the global risk factors. Hence, we compute 
the equally-weighted averages of these country-specific risks for sample countries within 
regional portfolios to generate the regional risk factors. Within a regional portfolio, the 
country-specific risks are diversified away, leaving only the common region-specific risk 
component. 
Our approach captures the main sources of common global risks in the international 
sovereign debt market as well as the sources of region-specific risks. This allows us to 
consider whether sovereign credit events load on and thus works to affect the multiple global 
risk factors or regional risk factor driving spread changes. An analysis of the global and 
regional risk factors underpinning spread movements provides a different perspective on the 
commonalities in the dynamics of sovereign CDS spreads compared to the systemic risk 
measure based on default intensities implied from a term structure of sovereign CDS spreads 
(Ang and Longstaff, 2013). The advantage of our factor-based approach is that it is not 
benchmarked on individual major world economies like the U.S. and Germany and provide a 
more comprehensive picture on the different sources of risk within the global sovereign credit 
market over time. This allows us to assess the specific risk channels through which sovereign 
credit events affect multiple countries during episodes of sovereign credit contagion.  
To extract the global risk factors, we follow the dynamic factor approach proposed by Forni 
et al. (2005) to perform a generalized principal component analysis (GPCA). This approach 
allows us to explicitly account for the cross-sectional correlations between individual 
5 See Forni et al. (2005) for further details on the generalized PCA implemented. The generalized PCA cannot 
handle missing observations so when CDS spreads are missing due to infrequent trading we assume that the 
spreads stay constant until the next reported spread. 
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countries’ sovereign CDS spread movements. Our core sample for extracting global risk 
factors following this approach consists of CDS spreads for 19 sovereign obligors - Brazil, 
Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Turkey, China, Philippines, 
Russia, Thailand, Bulgaria, Poland, Qatar, Japan, Malaysia and Croatia. These countries have 
the longest time history of sovereign CDS spreads and are representative of the developed 
and emerging markets across the main geographical regions in the world with the exception 
of North America.6 As in Forni et al. (2005), we estimate the covariance matrices of common 
and idiosyncratic components. The eigenvalues are calculated based on a frequency domain 
principal component which allows for efficient aggregation of the variables and minimization 
of idiosyncratic errors. The eigenvalues from our initial GPCA are illustrated in Figure 1. It 
can be seen that the first ten principal components explain 96.1% of the total variation in 
daily sovereign CDS spreads, with the first component alone explaining 43.9% of these 
variations.7 This analysis supports the use of a multifactor asset pricing framework for 
explaining co-movements in sovereign CDS spreads. We interpret these principal 
components as the set of common global sovereign risk factors that are priced into sovereign 
CDS spreads.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Hence, we regress the ten multiple global sovereign risk factors extracted as principal 
components onto individual sovereign CDS spread changes as follows:8 
6 We do not include the United States in this core group from which we extract generalized principal 
components as sovereign CDS data was not available consistently for the US until the beginning of 2008. 
7 This is comparable with the PCA performed by Longstaff et al. (2011) from which they found the first 
principal component (PC) of monthly sovereign CDS spread changes could account for 31.7% of the spread 
variations over the years from 2000-2007. Our generalized PCA is performed at a higher (daily) frequency and 
accounts for a larger proportion of the total spread variations.  
8 This multifactor asset pricing framework is similar to that used by Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) in their 
global stock market integration study. They also used the first ten principal components, which they found to be 
sufficient to explain approximately 90% of the total variations in all country stock returns.  
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 ∆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡10𝑚𝑚=1    (6) 
where ∆Sit represents the change in country i’s sovereign CDS spread between day t-1 and 
day t and PCm,t represents the mth principal component for day t estimated from the panel of 
sovereign CDS spread changes on day t-1.  
Market reactions observed during the European sovereign debt crisis suggest that 
international sovereign debt markets have become more closely interconnected on a regional 
as well as global scale. The revelation of budgetary problems in Greece in late 2009 and 
subsequent revelations in neighbouring countries in Southern Europe reverberated throughout 
all European debt markets (Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013; Kalbaska and Gatkowski, 2012). 
Hence, we also account for regional risk to aid our investigation into global credit risk 
spillovers. 
Our regional risk factor is computed by taking the cross-sectional average of the estimated 
residuals obtained from equation (6) for countries within specific regions: 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 1𝑁𝑁 ∑ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1          (7) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡   is the regional sovereign risk factor for all countries i = 1,…, N within 
a given geographical region  j ϵ {LA, EU, EEU, MENA, AP} at time t.   
 
3.2.1 Determinants of global and regional spillovers 
In the final part of our empirical analyses, we explore the mechanisms behind the global and 
regional spillover of sovereign credit risk by looking separately at the behaviour of: 1) the 
individual global sovereign risk factors and 2) the regional risk factors. Since there are a large 
number of variables that could be potentially related to sovereign credit risk, we rely on prior 
research on sovereign credit risk to narrow down our selection of determinants (Ang and 
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Longstaff, 2013; Longstaff et al., 2011). We focus on a parsimonious set of financial 
variables and economic fundamentals for explaining separately the two underlying risk 
channels through which sovereign credit risk can spread to multiple countries. These 
variables are described below.  
 
The time series regressions that we estimate are of the form: 
𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛤𝛤𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝛤𝛤𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡   (8) 
where SovRisk_Channelt is either one of the global sovereign risk factors {PC1, PC2..PC4, 
PC5} or the regional risk factors (Region_Risk). Crediteventt is a matrix comprising 
indicators for either all credit events or region-specific credit events detected and their 
interactions with an EU_Crisis dummy. The dummy takes a value of 1 from 2009 and 0 
before to capture the specific effects of the European sovereign debt crisis, which is dated 
based on the sequence of events detailed in BIS (2011) in the lead up to that crisis. Controlst 
is a matrix of global market-based and country fundamentals-based explanatory variables. 
However, only the latter are used to explain regional sovereign risks given that global 
financial market forces are by definition more relevant for global sovereign risks. 
 
In our set of global market variables, we have the following: returns on the S&P 500 stock 
market index (Stock_return) which serves as a broad indicator on global financial conditions; 
the change in the VIX, the implied volatility index on the S&P 500 (VIX), serves as a proxy 
for global risk appetite; and the CDX North American Investment Grade index of CDS 
spreads (Corp_Sprds) is included to capture corporate credit conditions. These global 
financial market variables have been shown to account for much of the commonalities in 
sovereign CDS spread movements internationally (Ang and Longstaff (2013) and Longstaff 
et al. (2011)).  
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 For the set of economic fundamentals, we focus on two variables that indicate the ability of a 
sovereign to service and repay its foreign debt. Our first variable is based on sovereign credit 
ratings assigned by the three major international credit rating agencies – Standard and Poors, 
Moodys Investor Services and Fitch Ratings – and we take the average changes in sovereign 
ratings across rating agencies (Sov_rating_chg). The sovereign credit ratings on long-term 
sovereign debt denominated in foreign currencies are first converted into linear scores 
following the approach of Gande and Parsley (2005). Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) 
previously documented that sovereign CDS spreads react significantly to changes in 
sovereign credit ratings. For our second variable, we consider the ratio of Debt to GDP 
(Debt_GDP) to account for the relationship between a country’s level of indebtedness relative 
to the size of its economy and its ability to service its financial obligations (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2010). When we conduct the risk spillover analysis at the regional level using time 
series regressions, we take the average of the above variables across all countries within each 
regional group. However, to assess the global risk spillovers we take averages of these 
country-specific variables across all countries in our global sample.  
 
Lastly, we construct a variable of special interest. This variable is a credit event indicator 
(Reg_creditevent) that takes a value of one when there is a regional sovereign credit event as 
defined by equation (1). Our a priori assumption is that episodes of intra-regional credit 
contagion would spillover over a longer period to affect multiple countries’ sovereign credit 
market either through the global sovereign risk factor or the regional sovereign risk factor 
over time. To understand the spillover effects beyond the region of origin, we also examine a 
global indicator, Other_ creditevent, which indicates whether a credit event has taken place in 
one of the other four (non-North American) regions in the sample. We expect the 
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Other_creditevent variable to be generally less important than the region-specific ones in 
affecting the regional risk spillovers within geographical regions. 
 
The data for these variables are obtained from the Bloomberg system and Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. The only exception is the gross level of general government debt to GDP, which 
is obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook database. 
 
4. Main Findings 
4.1  Fast-and-furious contagion: regional and global 
The sovereign credit events detected in each sample year are shown in Table 2. Over the full 
sample period there were 89 credit events involving 20 sovereign countries. The average size 
of the spread jumps (at the threshold level k = 99.9%) was 228 basis points, the maximum 
jump was 1216 basis points (for Uruguay in 2003) and the smallest jump was 43 basis points 
(for Ireland in 2010). Sovereign credit events occurred in every region and involved a wider 
cross-section of sovereigns over time. Table 2 indicates how prevalent sovereign credit 
problems have been over the last decade. Within Europe, the sovereign credit events involved 
Iceland, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Italy and Cyprus over the period from 2008 to 2013; in 
Eastern Europe, they involved Russia and Ukraine in 2008; in Latin America, they involved 
Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela and Uruguay; in the Middle East and North Africa, 
they involved Lebanon, Bahrain and Turkey; and in the Asia-Pacific region, they involved 
Indonesia and Pakistan. 
Several interesting observations can be made. First, while such extreme jumps in sovereign 
spreads used to be larger in magnitude and were confined to a handful of emerging market 
sovereigns, the period since the global subprime debt crisis of 2008 saw credit events 
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involving a larger number of sovereigns but spread jumps of smaller magnitudes. Since 2008, 
the sovereign credit events have involved advanced countries as well as emerging markets – 
marking a new phenomenon in international sovereign debt markets. Second, the frequency 
of sovereign credit events increased dramatically over time. Out of the 89 credit events 
identified, 71 of them were concentrated in the 2008-2013 period. There were no sovereign 
credit events during 2004 and 2007, and only one event occurred during 2005 (specifically, 
Ecuador). In all other years, there were multiple sovereign credit events. The number of 
sovereign credit events peaked in 2008 at 23 during the subprime debt crisis and the events 
were spread across all the regions. The fallout from the subprime debt crisis continued into 
2009-2010, with major sovereign credit events involving Iceland and Ireland, two countries 
with banking sectors that were heavily exposed to risky mortgage debt. The bailout of 
troubled banks by national governments led to sovereign debt problems as highlighted by 
Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl (2014) and Dieckmann and Plank (2012). Subsequently, 
sovereign credit events occurred in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Cyprus, marking the European 
sovereign debt crisis from 2009-2013. Upon closer examination of the economic news behind 
the credit events since the GFC in Appendix Table B (sourced from Eurostat and the Federal 
Reserve System), we find two distinct phases within our full sample period. In the earlier 
period during 2008, credit events corresponded closely to the news on policies and actions 
made by the Federal Reserve Bank to inject liquidity into the US but subsequently the 
triggers for the detected credit events from late 2008 switched to macroeconomic news 
concerning the health of the EU.   
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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The event study on regional sovereign credit portfolios shows that sovereign credit events 
have immediate and significant effects on other sovereigns within the same geographical 
region. These results are presented in Table 3 for the full period and for two sub-periods, the 
post-GFC period of 2007-2013 and the shorter post-European debt crisis period of 2009-
2013. The intra-regional responses are both statistically and economically significant. Over 
2002-2013, on average a sovereign credit event increases the CDS spreads of other sovereign 
obligors in the region by 26 basis points on the same day (t=0). The cumulative impact is 
smaller for the two-day window [0,1] at 18 basis points, suggesting an initial degree of mean-
reversion on the day after the credit event. The effect on the second day after the credit event, 
however, reinforces the effect on the event day, leading to an average cumulative impact of 
32 basis points over the three-day window [0, 2]. These regional credit portfolio reactions are 
all highly significant at the 1% level. In addition, there are no significant reactions prior to the 
events, which suggest that sovereign credit events tended not to be anticipated. These results 
vindicate a form of contagion that is indeed “fast and furious” as characterized by Kaminsky, 
Reinhart and Vegh (2003).  
The same-day contagion results remain robust for the more recent crisis sub-periods of 2007-
2013 and 2009-2013, during which 80% of our credit events occurred, but the day-after and 
second day responses disappear after 2007. If contagion had been “fast and furious” before 
2007, it has become even more so since then. Our pre-2007 event sample is predominantly 
characterized by the Latin American crisis, whereas the post-2007 sample is dominated by 
events in the Eurozone periphery countries. Our findings reveal that, despite the financial 
crisis and volatility of financial markets, the price discovery process functions efficiently for 
sovereign CDS, i.e. recent CDS spread changes cannot be predicted with past CDS spread 
changes. The size of the sovereign CDS market has increased noticeably since 2008 
facilitating the correct pricing and efficiency of sovereign credit markets. The post-2008 
19 
 
surge likely relates to the need to hedge derivative counterparty credit risk exposure that had 
to be more fully disclosed under new accounting rules that came into effect in 2006. Our 
findings are in line with Gündüz and Kaya (2013) who document informational efficiency in 
the Eurozone sovereign CDS market and lack of long memory behaviour in the period post-
2007. On the other hand, they show significant persistence in the volatility of CDS spread 
changes in Eurozone periphery countries, which is linked to heightened sovereign risk 
premia.  
Lastly, the event study results show a credit contagion effect that is larger in magnitude over 
the full sample than in the recent sub-sample periods for post-GFC and post-EDC. This is an 
artefact of the lower CDS spreads in the European region where the latter credit events are 
concentrated and does not go to suggest that the earlier crises in Latin America and East Asia 
were economically more significant. 
 [Insert Table 3 here] 
 
With respect to the global portfolio, the results suggest that credit contagion often spreads 
beyond the regional bounds of the credit event, although the effect is not as strong as that on 
the region of origin. Panel B of Table 3 presents these results. Similar to the regional results, 
there is no evidence of any anticipation of the event.  As before the same-day reaction (t=0) is 
the strongest, however it is the only day that is statistically significant even for the full 
sample period. This same-day reaction of the global portfolio averages 6 basis points, which 
is only about a quarter of the size of the reaction of the regional portfolio. The immediate 
global response from credit events is surprisingly weak during the European debt crisis sub-
period indicating this was largely a region specific concern. The average impact during the 
2009-2013 sub-period was only 3 basis points, statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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 Finally, Panel C of Table 3 reports the results of the regional analysis after adjusting the 
reaction of the regional credit portfolio for the global change in credit risk. The results are 
qualitatively similar to those shown in Panel A. The regional effects remain strongly 
significant even after adjusting for global credit risk levels. This is particularly the case for 
the event day, for which the regional response to sovereign credit events is 20 basis points 
over the full sample and about 7 or 8 basis points in the recent sub-sample crisis periods. 
 
4.2  The slow-burn global spillover of sovereign risk 
To understand the slow-burn global spillover of sovereign credit risk, we look at the two 
main sources of systematic risk behind the comovement of sovereign CDS spreads, namely, 
changes in the global risk factor and changes in the regional risk factors which market 
participants are exposed to. We then analyze separately the impact of sovereign credit events 
on these two risk transmission channels.  
 
4.2.1 A first look at the global risk factors 
We start by looking at the behaviour of the predominant global sovereign risk factors over 
our full sample period. The peaks in global sovereign risk cycles have coincided with the 
occurrence of sovereign credit events. As can be seen in Figure 2, the first five principal 
components extracted (PC1,..PC5) vary dramatically over time. Yet, they follow similar 
cyclical patterns in their movements and the peaks coincide with the Latin American debt 
crises in the early 2000s and then with the height of the international financial crisis before 
the onset of the European debt crisis that was triggered by Greece’s growing budgetary 
problems from 2009. Global sovereign credit risk was at the lowest levels from 2006-2007, 
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before the global risk factors rose sharply from September 2008. This is the period that 
immediately followed Lehman Brother’s Bankruptcy. This is also a period that coincides 
with the high concentration of sovereign credit events identified from our event study.  
 
[Insert Figure 2] 
 
Global sovereign credit risk levels particularly that captured by PC4, remained relatively 
elevated, albeit lower than the peak, marking the onset of the entire 2008-2013 sub-period in 
which there is an intense clustering of credit events. A downward trend in the global risk 
factor started in 2011, coinciding with the time that the European Central Bank (ECB) 
launched its Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) to ease the European sovereign 
debt crisis.  Through this market intervention, the ECB provided almost €1 trillion in 3-year 
loans to European banks, which not only served to push down money market interest rates 
across Europe but also lowered sovereign bond yields for Italy and Spain. The intervention 
helped to reduce fears in global financial markets that banks might collapse and bring down 
the public finances of other countries in the EU like Italy and Spain. Clearly, variations in 
global sovereign credit risk levels map closely to our detected sovereign credit events and in 
turn the real-life news events that triggered the corresponding spread jumps (see Appendix 
Table B). Hence, we conduct parallel regression analyses on the variations in the global risk 
factor to provide a more complete investigation on the contagious spread of the country-
specific sovereign credit events that have already been identified. Table 4 provides the 
summary statistics of the first ten principal components representing time-varying global 
sovereign risk factors. 
 
[Insert Table 4] 
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 In Table 4, it can be observed that the first four global sovereign risk factors are the highest 
on average with means ranging from 132.05 bps (PC3) to 806.59 bps (PC4) and also vary the 
most with standard deviations ranging from 80.33 bps (for PC3)  to 603.37 bps (for PC1).  
We expect these first few global risk factors would relate most closely to the spread jumps 
underpinning the credit events that we have identified. We formally test this in subsequent 
regression analyses. 
 
4.2.2 A first look at the regional risk factors 
We now turn to the other common risk factor that is likely to affect sovereign credit spreads 
across countries, namely regional sovereign risk (Region_risk). Recall that our estimates of 
the time-variations in region-specific sovereign risks are based on the cross-sectional 
averages of the residual risks from our country-level multi-factor asset pricing models shown 
in equation (6). Table 5 provides the summary statistics of these regional risk factors, and 
Figure 3 shows their dynamics.  
[Insert Figure 3]  & [Insert Table 5] 
 
In Table 5, it can be observed that the regional risk factors are on average very close to zero 
as they are estimated as the cross-sectional averages of residual (idiosyncratic) risks for 
countries within geographical regions. We find that the Asia-Pacific region is perhaps the 
least globally integrated with other sovereign debt markets in the world as the mean regional 
risk is the largest in magnitude at -0.093 bps corroborating with the low correlation in 
sovereign risks previously documented for Asia with the rest of the world by Remolona, 
Scatigna and Wu (2008). Furthermore, we find that regional risk factors for Latin America 
and Western Europe have been the most volatile with the standard deviations of 15.64 bps 
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and 13.90 bps, respectively consistent with the distinct clustering of regional risks shown in 
Figure 3 during the Latin American debt crises in the early 2000s and in 2011 during the 
most recent European sovereign debt crisis. These episodes of regional risk clustering 
correspond closely to the timing of spread jumps underpinning the credit events that we have 
identified. We formally test this in subsequent regression analyses. 
 
4.3 Explaining the sovereign risk spillover channels  
Can we explain what lies behind the global risk factors and the regional risk factors for 
different sovereign borrowers? Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang (2009) suggest that the time-
variations in the underlying risk factors can account for a large proportion of the movements 
of asset prices. In the analysis below, we separately analyze the time-variation in the main 
global risk factors and the regional risk factors, primarily focusing on the protracted effects of 
sovereign credit events while controlling for financial market variables and economic 
fundamentals.  
 
4.3.1 Do credit events affect the global risk factors? 
We turn first to the global risk factors. In Table 6, we report time-series regression results for 
the first five principal components previously extracted to represent the most dominant global 
sovereign risk factors as dependent variables in equation (8).9 To examine whether country-
specific credit events may have global spillover effects, we regress each common global risk 
factor on the credit event indicator (Creditevent) which takes on a value of 1 in the periods 
when there are credit events in any of the sampled countries and zero otherwise and also its 
interaction with a time dummy marking the European debt crisis (EU_crisis). We also control 
9 We only report the regression estimates for the first five PCs as they already account for 86.4% of cumulative 
eigenvalues. We do not find the sovereign credit events have a significant loading on subsequent PCs. Results 
are available upon request.  
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for a set of global financial market and economic fundamental variables. Specifically, we 
capture global financial market performance using U.S. stock market index returns on the 
S&P 500 (Stock_return) and changes in its implied volatility index (VIX) and corporate 
credit risk conditions, measured as changes in the CDX Investment Grade corporate CDS 
index. Macroeconomic fundamentals are proxied by sovereign credit rating changes and by 
debt to GDP levels both computed as averages for all countries.  
 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
We highlight four main results. Firstly, prior to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, country-
specific credit events were inversely related to global sovereign risks as they presented 
diversification benefits that reduced the global sovereign credit portfolio risks. Changes in 
individual country sovereign CDS spreads that are idiosyncratic in nature and are not 
correlated with other sovereign obligors’ CDS spread movements present an effective risk-
reduction benefit for the global portfolio of sovereign CDS. This is evident in the significant 
and negative effect of the creditevent variable on PC1 and PC5. The estimated coefficients 
indicate that when there is a significant country-specific credit event, global risk falls by 
between 24.7 and 46.3 basis points.   
 
Secondly and most strikingly, during the Eurozone debt crisis, interaction terms for the credit 
events exerted significant protracted risk spillover effects and worked to heighten the global 
sovereign risks contributed by PC1, PC2 and PC5 in the order of 58.4, 41.9 and 27.5 bps, 
respectively. This indicates that global risk spillovers became a new risk transmission 
channel in the Eurozone debt crisis and was the mechanism through which European troubles 
spread around the global financial system. We note that the EU crisis loads significantly on 
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all PCs shown in Table 6.  Taken together, the first two results suggest that sovereign credit 
events are usually harmless if they occur sporadically in isolation. However, during the EU 
crisis, when these credit events became clustered closely together, they rapidly spilled over 
and contributed to the global sovereign risk transmission channel and the debt crisis quickly 
became a global fiasco.  
 
Thirdly, the global risk factors are all heavily influenced by U.S. financial market variables. 
These control variables behave in the expected manner. US stock market returns load 
significantly and negatively onto the first five PCs indicating that stronger financial market 
performance lowers global sovereign credit risks. The significant and positive loadings on the 
VIX and Corp_sprds suggests that heightened risk aversion is what is largely behind 
increases in the global risk factor. The results corroborate the explanatory power of U.S. 
market-based variables for sovereign CDS spreads and its comovements documented in prior 
studies (Ang and Longstaff (2013), Longstaff et al. (2011), Dieckmann and Plank (2012)). 
 
Finally, we find that the dominant global risk factors load heavily on debt to GDP levels 
across all sample countries. PC3 is the only global risk factor that loads significantly onto 
sovereign credit rating changes. However the effect is economically small as a single notch 
increase in average sovereign credit ratings reduces global risk by 9 bps. This suggests that 
common global movements in sovereign credit spreads predominantly reflect global risk 
appetites and a wake up to indebtedness around the world. This is consistent with the findings 
of Ang and Longstaff (2013) and Longstaff et al. (2011) and the recent work of Rey (2015) 
revealing that the pattern of capital flows follows a global financial cycle which is 
synchronized with fluctuations in world market risk aversion and uncertainty as proxied by 
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the VIX. The strong loading on debt to GDP levels resounds strongly with the debt threshold 
effects highlighted by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010).  
 
4.3.2 Do credit events affect the regional risk factors? 
We now turn to assess what determines the variations in the regional risk factors. In Table 7, 
we report time-series regressions for explaining different regions’ own sovereign risk, as 
captured by the cross-sectional average of estimated residuals for countries within 
geographical regions. As expected, credit events that take place outside the specific region 
(Other_ creditevent) have insignificant impacts on the regional risk factors whilst intra-
regional credit events usually have consistently positive spillover effects on neighboring 
countries within the same region. Intra-regional contagion is stronger within the Asia-Pacific 
and Latin America suggesting greater regional integration in these sovereign credit markets. 
Sovereign credit shocks within these two regions are the most economically significant and 
work to increase regional risks in the Asia-Pacific by 50.1 bps and across Latin America by 
44.1 bps, respectively. Interestingly, cross-regional credit contagion remained insignificant 
even during the EU debt crisis, based on the interactions between other_creditevent and the 
EU crisis indicator variables. The EU debt crisis has increased regional risk in Western 
Europe by 9.87 bps over other periods in our full sample. Thus, whilst there is usually a clear 
distinction between the influence of credit events on the global risk factors and regional risk 
factors as risk spillover mechanisms, in the recent European sovereign debt crisis both 
became additional channels of sovereign credit contagion within Europe and globally. 
However, the Asia-Pacific sovereign credit markets are unique in that during the European 
debt crisis their region-specific credit events had a lesser impact on increasing regional risk 
with a combined impact of 17 bps compared to the usual 50 bps suggesting that sovereigns in 
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the Asia-Pacific were perceived to be relatively less risky and a safer bet during the European 
debt crisis. 
[Insert Table 7] 
 
In regressions for explaining the time-variations in regional risk factors, only economic 
fundamentals that are specific to countries within geographical regions are averaged and used 
as controls. We find that both Sov_rating_chg and Debt_GDP tend to exert significant 
influence on regional risk factors and they enter with the expected negative and positive 
signs, respectively. Sovereign creditworthiness assessed by credit rating agencies and 
reflected in sovereign credit ratings are more significant in explaining regional risks in those 
emerging market regions that are more prone to political instability like Eastern Europe and 
MENA. Interestingly, fundamentals are insignificant determinants of regional risk in Latin 
America suggesting that they are still plagued by their chequered debt history and market 
participants are not even pricing credit risks conveyed by their economic performance. These 
results corroborate Beirne and Fratzscher‘s (2013) detection of a ‘wake up’ contagion in 
sovereign yield spreads to economic fundamentals in recent years. We extend current 
knowledge by showing that the ‘wake up’ to fundamentals occurred via the pricing of both 
global and regional sovereign credit risks. 
 
In sum, we find that the global spillover of sovereign risks was escalated by sovereign credit 
events occurring during the recent European sovereign debt crisis. The transmission of 
sovereign credit risk was reinforced by rising global risk aversion in major financial markets 
and by escalating debt to GDP levels around the world, as national governments provided 
bailouts for troubled banking sectors. On the other hand, credit event spillovers within 
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regions depends more on economic fundamentals. These findings provide new evidence on 
the risk transmission mechanisms for sovereign credit contagion. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper investigates the regional and global propagation of sovereign credit risk by 
distinguishing between two propagation mechanisms, “fast and furious” contagion and “slow 
burn” spillovers. We first examine “fast and furious” contagion through an event study to 
assess the immediate geographical impact of major sovereign credit events, identified as 
extraordinary jumps in daily sovereign CDS spreads. The resulting sovereign credit events 
are mostly clustered during the post-subprime and European sovereign debt crisis periods. 
The findings suggest that although some sovereign credit events exert immediate effects that 
are global in reach, the effects of most credit events are limited to the region of origin. Fast-
and-furious contagion seems to be largely a regional phenomenon. 
 
We then look at “slow burn” risk spillovers by analyzing the variations in a global risk factors 
extracted from a generalized principal component analysis and then construct regional risk 
factors as the regional averages of the residual risks in a multi-factor pricing model. These 
can be conceptualized as two distinct slow burn risk spillover channels to neighboring 
countries or to the rest of the world. Most strikingly, in separately analyzing the determinants 
of the most dominant global risk factors and the regional risk factors, we find that sovereign 
credit events became systemic problems and significantly amplified global risk factors during 
the recent European debt crisis. In other times, country-specific credit events only have 
spillover effects within the region and usually present diversification benefits for global 
sovereign credit portfolios. We find that U.S. financial market variables and debt to GDP 
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levels load heavily on the global risk factors while sovereign credit ratings matter more for 
the residual risks in regions with greater political risks.  
 
Our results support two risk channels for the propagation of sovereign credit risk. First, a 
major sovereign credit event has an immediate impact on the risk premia of neighbouring 
countries, although occasionally the impact is also global. Second, there is a slower process 
by which such an event builds up regional and global risk factors, with the latter fuelled by 
both global investors’ risk aversion and the wake up to rising debt to GDP levels. Our 
research provides a better understanding of how seemingly country- or region-specific 
sovereign debt problems can proliferate widely to induce financial instability around the 
world as witnessed over the 2008-2013 period. For future research in this area, there is scope 
to delve into the specific sectors or types of firms through which sovereign risk contagion is 
most readily transmitted across national borders.  
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Figure 1. Eigenvalues for sovereign CDS spreads 2002-2013 
 
This figure shows the average cumulative percentage of variance explained by sorted eigenvalues. 
The variance decomposition is calculated based on principal components extracted from a generalised 
principal components analysis on a group of 19 core countries with the longest history of sovereign 
CDS spreads over all sample years. Eigenvectors are computed and sorted from the largest to the 
smallest eigenvalue. We retain the first 10 general principal components to proxy global sovereign 
risk factors, as they account for 96.1% of cumulative eigenvalues.  
 
Eigenvalues for sovereign CDS spreads 2002-2013 
Cumulative percentage of variance explained Graph 1 
% 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 2. Rising global sovereign credit risks and credit events over time 2002-2013 
 
This figure depicts the build-up of sovereign credit risk in the global financial system as represented 
by the first five principal components over time (PC1,…,PC5) alongside the credit event indicator 
(vertical bars) which takes a value of 1 on days when there were large jumps detected in sovereign 
credit spreads and zero otherwise.  
 
 
Principal components and the credit events over time Graph 2 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 3. Time varying regional systematic risks and credit events over time 2002-2013 
 
This figure shows the residual sovereign credit risks for each region over the period from 2002-2013 
together with the credit event indicator which takes a value of 1 on days when extreme jumps in 
sovereign CDS spreads are detected and zero otherwise.  
 
Regional average residuals and the credit events over time Graph 3 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
36 
 
Table 1. Distribution of sovereign CDS spreads  
 
Panel A of this table presents the summary statistics on daily sovereign CDS spreads (in basis points) 
by region over the entire sample period from 2002 to 2013. Panel B presents the summary statistics on 
daily changes in sovereign CDS spreads (in basis points) by region over the full sample period. N x T 
represents the total number of country-day observations available across regions. The statistics 
described below include the mean, median, standard deviation, the minimum and maximum values as 
well as the 95th, 99th and 99.9th percentile cutoffs. 
 
       Quantiles 
Region NxT Mean Med. Std. Max Min 95% 99% 99.90
% 
Panel A: CDS spreads 
Latin America 32894 379 174 728 10350 12 1165 3501 10350 
Europe 47424 110 14 471 21681 1 441 1111 8083 
Eastern Europe 38410 172 102 260 5479 3 531 986 3364 
MENA 23214 197 152 169 1254 8 508 801 1148 
Asia-Pacific 31548 152 79 257 3334 1 513 935 3015 
All countries 173490 194 96 448 21681 1 637 1557 5508 
Panel B: CDS spreads changes 
Latin America 32819 -0.0580 0 37.31 1215.50 -4162.33 17.43 55.74 254.49 
Europe 47320 0.5564 0 60.68 8439.10 -3950.46 5.68 23.19 227.68 
Eastern Europe 38344 0.0054 0 14.86 1410.07 -707.10 9.37 28.03 106.60 
MENA 23106 -0.0285 0 9.31 257.29 -141.66 7.59 23.12 111.30 
Asia-Pacific 31452 -0.0009 0 16.64 834.88 -1005.52 6.57 21.44 119.01 
All countries 173041 0.1383 0 37.18 8439.10 -4162.33 9.12 31.22 153.93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
Table 2.  Summary statistics on all sovereign credit events 2002-2013 
 
This table provides a break-down of the total number of sovereign credit events (extreme CDS jumps) 
detected by year and the number of regions from which these events arose as well as the countries 
where they emanate over the sample period from 2002-2013. Summary statistics on the average size, 
standard deviation and the range of the extreme jumps in sovereign CDS spreads defining the 
sovereign credit events are also shown for each year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year N(events) N(regions) Sovereigns
Mean Median StDev Max Min
2002 11 3 Brazil, Uruguay, Venezuela, Turkey, Indonesia 416.47 333.33 290.69 968.66 116.34
2003 4 3 Argentina, Uruguay, Turkey,Indonesia 515.12 357.63 507.70 1215.50 129.71
2004 0 0
2005 1 1 Ecuador 286.45
2006 2 2 Ecuador, Lebanon 220.13 220.13 192.76 356.44 83.83
2007 0 0
2008 23 5 Argentina, Ecuador, Uruguay, Iceland, Ireland, 249.04 160.72 205.36 834.88 48.01
Russia, Ukraine,  Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt
Indonesia, Pakistan
2009 14 4 Iceland, Ireland, Ukraine, Bahrain,Pakistan 169.42 170.13 78.80 350.10 49.58
2010 9 1 Ireland, Greece 68.25 65.78 25.94 132.23 47.56
2011 8 1 Greece, Italy, Portugal 93.64 80.93 38.45 159.57 60.19
2012 12 3 Argentina, Cyprus, Malta, Portugal, Pakistan 167.18 103.43 167.19 554.13 49.63
2013 5 2 Argentina, Cyprus 334.33 137.30 443.03 1109.49 51.79
2002-2013 89 5 N(Sovereigns suffering credit event) = 20 / 66 228.36 145.44 238.53 1215.50 43.45
CDS Spread Jump (bps)
38 
 
Table 3.  Regional and global “fast and furious” reactions to sovereign credit events  
 
This table presents the average reaction of regional (Panel A), global (Panel B) and regional risk-
adjusted (Panel C) portfolio credit spreads to each sovereign credit event in basis points on individual 
days around the event date and over different event windows around the event.  In Panel A for each 
event, the regional portfolio is an equally weighted portfolio of sovereign CDS spreads of all the non-
event countries in the same region as the credit event country.  In Panel B for each event, the global 
portfolio is an equally weighted portfolio of sovereign CDS spreads of all the countries in the four 
non-event regions in the sample plus the U.S. In Panel C, each sovereign’s CDS spread change is 
adjusted for movements in the global credit risk levels by deducting the global spread index from the 
sovereign’s CDS spread. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Event 
Window Mean spread change t-stat Mean spread change t-stat Mean spread change t-stat
Panel A: Regional Response
-2 -0.86 -0.28 0.73 0.25 0.50 0.14
-1 0.53 0.17 -0.37 -0.13 -4.54 -1.23
0 25.84 8.40 *** 16.31 5.66 *** 10.23 2.76 ***
1 -8.20 -2.67 *** 4.22 1.47 1.09 0.30
2 14.04 4.57 *** 0.97 0.34 0.73 0.20
[-2, 0] 25.51 4.79 *** 16.66 3.34 *** 6.19 0.97
[-1, 0] 26.36 6.06 *** 15.93 3.91 *** 5.69 1.09
[0, 1] 17.64 2.87 *** 20.53 3.57 *** 11.32 1.53
[0, 2] 31.68 3.43 *** 21.50 2.49 *** 12.06 1.09
[-2,2] 31.35 4.56 *** 21.85 3.39 *** 8.02 0.97
[-1,1] 18.16 3.41 *** 20.16 4.04 *** 6.78 1.06
Panel B: Global Response
-2 0.32 0.22 -1.66 -1.20 -1.16 -0.70
-1 0.30 0.21 1.85 1.34 1.15 0.69
0 6.10 4.19 *** 8.52 6.17 *** 3.08 1.85 *
1 2.17 1.49 2.63 1.90 * 0.59 0.35
2 -1.75 -1.20 -1.62 -1.17 -1.98 -1.20
[-2, 0] 6.72 2.67 *** 8.71 3.64 *** 3.06 1.07
[-1, 0] 6.40 3.11 *** 10.37 5.30 *** 4.22 1.80 *
[0, 1] 8.27 2.84 *** 11.15 4.03 *** 3.66 1.10
[0, 2] 6.52 1.49 9.53 2.30 ** 1.68 0.34
[-2,2] 7.14 2.20 ** 9.72 3.15 *** 1.67 0.45
[-1,1] 8.57 3.40 *** 13.00 5.43 *** 4.81 1.67
Panel C: Regional Adjusted Response
-2 -1.18 -0.37 2.38 0.87 1.66 0.44
-1 0.23 0.07 -2.22 -0.81 -5.69 -1.49
0 19.74 6.26 *** 7.79 2.83 *** 7.16 1.88 *
1 -10.37 -3.29 *** 1.59 0.58 0.51 0.13
2 15.79 5.01 *** 2.59 0.94 2.72 0.71
[-2, 0] 18.79 3.44 *** 7.95 1.67 * 3.13 0.47
[-1, 0] 19.97 4.48 *** 5.57 1.43 1.47 0.27
[0, 1] 9.37 1.49 *** 9.38 1.71 * 7.66 1.01
[0, 2] 25.16 2.66 *** 11.97 1.45 10.38 0.91
[-2,2] 24.21 3.43 ** 12.13 1.97 * 7.14 2.20 **
[-1,1] 9.60 1.76 *** 7.16 1.50 8.57 3.40 ***
2002-2013 2007-2013 2009-2013
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Table 4. Summary statistics on global sovereign risk factors  
 
This table reports summary statistics for the multiple global sovereign risk factors extracted as the 
first ten principal components (PC1, PC2…PC10) from our generalized principal component analysis. 
The principal components are estimated out-of-sample based on the previous year’s covariance matrix 
of sovereign CDS spreads from 19 core countries representing developed and emerging markets from 
Latin America, Europe, Eastern Europe, MENA and the Asia-Pacific regions. N represents the 
number of observations. The statistics described below include the mean, median, standard deviation, 
the minimum and maximum values as well as the 95th, 99th and 99.9th percentile cutoffs. 
 
       Quantiles 
 N Mean Median Std. Max Min 95% 99% 99.90% 
Principal components 
PC1 2934 410.05 147.97 603.37 3541.85 57.64 1809.55 3125.98 3530.21 
PC2 2934 275.56 159.04 234.78 1304.52 61.42 740.92 1221.80 1295.34 
PC3 2934 132.05 111.39 80.33 543.23 30.96 327.74 384.40 479.32 
PC4 2934 806.59 736.52 531.65 3069.14 110.90 1851.11 2545.02 3046.09 
PC5 2934 41.02 9.02 52.60 230.90 -4.06 155.79 203.00 219.32 
PC6 2934 54.38 13.04 75.38 333.18 -28.57 231.79 285.00 315.00 
PC7 2934 98.80 17.17 138.93 580.61 -9.43 405.62 515.82 561.55 
PC8 2934 96.74 17.07 131.91 531.85 -21.73 412.75 492.80 527.68 
PC9 2934 175.75 178.29 128.46 658.77 14.22 385.36 561.95 648.42 
PC10 2934 166.70 126.21 136.10 570.82 14.95 451.39 523.62 553.22 
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Table 5. Summary statistics on regional risk factors  
 
This table reports summary statistics for the regional risk factors constructed as the cross-sectional 
averages of country-specific residual risks within different geographical regions from the multi-factor 
pricing model represented in equation (6). The regional risk factors are shown for Latin America 
(LA_Risk), Europe (EU_Risk), Eastern Europe (EEU_Risk), MENA (MENA_Risk) and the Asia-
Pacific (AP_Risk) regions as well as all regions (All_Risk). N represents the number of observations. 
The statistics described below include the mean, median, standard deviation, the minimum and 
maximum values as well as the 95th, 99th and 99.9th percentile cutoffs. 
  
 
       Quantiles 
Region N Mean Median Std. Max Min 95% 99% 99.90% 
Regional average residuals 
LA_Risk 2933 -0.0479 -0.1456 15.64 175.98 -457.88 13.07 39.55 141.16 
EU_Risk 2933 -0.0344 -0.1460 13.90 465.74 -222.11 5.11 27.03 106.29 
EEU_Risk 2933 -0.0286 -0.0259 7.18 93.62 -78.83 7.66 20.54 72.79 
MENA_Risk 2933 -0.0403 -0.0492 4.59 64.24 -50.59 5.54 13.66 36.73 
AP_Risk 2933 -0.0929 -0.1882 6.51 105.05 -128.98 5.02 13.74 76.45 
All_Risk  2933 -0.0550 -0.1367 6.48 122.03 -111.82 6.35 17.60 66.32 
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Table 6.  Determinants of global sovereign risk factors, 2004-2013 
 
This table reports the estimated coefficients and other summary statistics from the regression of the 
first five global sovereign risk factors (PC1, PC2, PC3, PC4, PC5) on the indicated variables for the 
period from 29/01/2004 to 29/03/2013. The variable of interest, creditevent is an indicator variable 
that is equal to one when there is a sovereign credit event occurring within any sample country and 
zero otherwise. EU_crisis is an indicator variable taking a value of 1 from 2009 until the end of the 
sample and 0 otherwise. Stock_return denotes the return on the S&P500 stock market index and VIX 
denotes the daily change in the VIX implied volatility index and Corp_sprds denotes the daily change 
in the CDX Investment Grade corporate CDS index. Sov_rating_chg are the changes in sovereign 
credit rating assessments made by Standard and Poors, Moodys and Fitch averaged across all 
countries. Debt_GDP is the average ratio of all sample countries’ general government gross debt to 
gross domestic product. Adj. R-sq are the adjusted R-squared values for the time series regressions. N 
denotes the number of days used in the regressions. P-values are reported in parentheses (*, **, *** 
denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dep. Variable PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5
creditevent -46.278 *** -27.586 -11.632 -80.629 -24.713 ***
[0.0084] [0.1131] [0.1529] [0.2866] [0.0018]
creditevent*EU_crisis 58.406 *** 41.877 ** 18.662 81.075 27.517 ***
[0.0029] [0.0367] [0.1122] [0.3408] [0.0046]
EU_crisis -425.302 *** -280.943 *** -31.141 *** 358.294 *** 40.291 ***
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Stock_return -0.574 *** -0.466 *** -0.149 *** -0.827 *** -0.022 **
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0324]
VIX 1.395 * 0.770 1.604 *** 11.259 *** 1.834 ***
[0.0550] [0.2300] [0.0010] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Corp_sprds -0.233 0.170 0.792 *** 4.379 *** 0.246 ***
[0.1448] [0.2419] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.001]
Sov_rating_chg -1.255 3.863 -9.116 * -12.518 -6.687
[0.8291] [0.5010] [0.0803] [0.1433] [0.3367]
Debt_GDP 29.617 *** 17.030 *** 2.657 *** -4.930 2.873 ***
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.1495] [0.0000]
Constant -578.356 *** -98.950 * 58.768 * 1229.183 *** -218.261 ***
[0.0000] [0.0683] [0.0926] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Adj. R-sq 0.798 0.795 0.892 0.886 0.779
N 2392 2392 2392 2392 2392
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Table 7.  Determinants of regional sovereign risk factors, 2004-2013 
 
This table reports the estimated coefficients and other summary statistics from the regression of 
regional sovereign risk factors for Latin America (LA_Risk), Western Europe (EU_Risk), Eastern 
Europe (EEU_Risk), Middle-East and North Africa (MENA_Risk), and the Asia-Pacific (AP_Risk) 
on the indicated variables for the period from 29/01/2004 to 29/03/2013. Reg_creditevent (Other_ 
creditevent) is an indicator variable that is equal to one when there is a credit event within (outside of) 
the respective region. EU_crisis is an indicator variable taking a value of 1 from 2009 until the end of 
the sample and 0 otherwise. Sov_rating_chg are the changes in the regional average sovereign credit 
rating assessments made by Standard and Poors, Moodys and Fitch. Debt_GDP is the regional 
average ratio of each country’s general government gross debt to Gross Domestic Product. Adj. R-sq 
are the adjusted R-squared values for the time series regressions. N denotes the number of days used 
in the regional regressions. P-values are reported in parentheses (*, **, *** denote significance at the 
10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dep. Variable LA_Risk EU_Risk EEU_Risk MENA_Risk AP_Risk
Reg_creditevent 44.078 ** 5.831 *** 19.257 *** 33.936 *** 50.104 ***
[0.0400] [0.0000] [0.0027] [0.0015] [0.0001]
Other_creditevent 17.590 1.330 12.043 1.473 7.455
[0.1617] [0.1352] [0.1551] [0.5304] [0.3459]
Reg_creditevent*EU_crisis 6.407 9.874 ** 1.774 -8.905 -33.035 ***
[0.7955] [0.0178] [0.8145] [0.4036] [0.0096]
Other_creditevent*EU_crisis -12.669 -0.289 -7.601 -0.732 -5.390
[0.3151] [0.8388] [0.3754] [0.7681] [0.4986]
EU_crisis 0.079 1.052 -1.197 0.022 0.189
[0.9295] [0.4243] [0.1860] [0.9410] [0.8272]
Sov_rating_chg -0.175 -0.289 -1.317 ** -1.357 *** -0.542
[0.8460] [0.4959] [0.0219] [0.0003] [0.5496]
Debt_GDP 0.0631 0.0595 0.1297 * 0.0713 *** 0.0525
[0.4188] [0.4922] [0.0889] [0.0058] [0.5304]
Constant -1.258 -9.051 -20.419 ** -19.663 *** 4.051
[0.905] [0.3789] [0.0215] [0.0001] [0.7965]
Adj. R-sq 0.107 0.010 0.058 0.123 0.101
N 2392 2392 2392 2392 2392
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Appendix Table A: Constituents of Regional Groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Latin America Europe Eastern Europe MENA Asia Pacific North America
Argentina Austria Bulgaria Algeria Australia United States
Brazil Belgium Croatia Bahrain China
Chile Cyprus Czech Republic Egypt HongKong
Colombia Denmark Estonia Israel Indonesia
Costa Rica Finland Hungary Lebanon Japan
Ecuador France Kazakhstan Morocco Korea
El Salvador Germany Latvia Qatar Malaysia
Guatemala Greece Lithuania Turkey Pakistan
Mexico Iceland Poland Tunisia Philippines
Panama Ireland Romania Singapore
Peru Italy Russia Thailand
Uruguay Malta Slovakia Vietnam
Venezuela Netherlands Slovenia
Norway Ukraine
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
13 18 14 9 12 1 67
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Appendix Table B, Panel A: Real-life news and detected credit events during the 
European Debt Crisis 
 
In this Appendix table we provide a chronology of the real-life economic news releases in the 
US and the European Union (EU) during the height of the recent European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis (in Panel A) and the Global Financial Crisis (in Panel B) and the correspondence to the 
dates on which sovereign credit events were detected in our study (days when creditevent=1).  
 
Source: Eurostat 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/publications/collections/news_releases) 
and Federal Reserve System 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/all/2013all.htm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit event 
date US News EU News
14-Mar-12
16-Feb-12 February 6, 2012: Euro area government debt down to 87.4% of GDP
16-Jan-12
January 13, 2012: Euro area external trade surplus 6.9 bn euros;  
January 12, 2012: Industrial production down by 0.1% in both euro area and 
EU27
08-Dec-11 December 9, 2011: EU27 current account deficit 17.2 bn euros
01-Nov-11
19-Sep-11 September 16, 2011: Euro area external trade surplus 4.3 bn euros
09-Sep-11 September 9, 2011: EU27 current account deficit 43.2 bn euros
23-Aug-11
27-Jul-11 July 22, 2011: EU27 current account deficit 38.8 bn euros
18-Jul-11
06-Jul-11 July 1, 2011: Recession drove EU27 overall tax revenue down to 38.4% of GDP 
29-Dec-10
23-Nov-10 November 24, 2010: Industrial new orders down by 3.8% in euro area
27-Oct-10
23-Jun-10 June 28, 2010: EU27 tax ratio fell to 39.3% of GDP in 2008
01-Jun-10 May 28, 2010: EU27 deficit in trade in goods with Russia of 50 bn euros in 2009
14-May-10 May 12, 2010: Industrial production up by 1.3% in euro area
22-Apr-10
April 22, 2010: Euro area and EU27 government deficit at 6.3% and 6.8% of 
GDP respectively; EU27 current account deficit 9.2 bn euros
14-Apr-10 April 14, 2010: Industrial production up by 0.9% in euro area
27-Jan-10 January 22, 2010: EU27 current account deficit 27.7 bn euros
30-Oct-09
07-Oct-09
October 2, 2009: EU27 deficit in trade in goods with Brazil of 9 bn euros in 
2008, surplus of 3 bn in trade in services
30-Sep-09
10-Sep-09 September 11, 2009: EU27 current account deficit 55.1 bn euros
28-May-09
07-Apr-09 April 2, 2009: EU27 surplus in trade in goods with the USA of 63 bn euros
23-Mar-09 March 23, 2009: Euro area external trade deficit 10.5 bn euros
05-Mar-09 March 5, 2009: Euro area and EU27 GDP down by 1.5%
26-Feb-09
17-Feb-09 February 17, 2009: Euro area external trade deficit 32.1 bn euros
12-Feb-09 February 12, 2008: Industrial production down by 2.6% in euro area 
06-Feb-09
08-Jan-09 January 8, 2009: Euro area and EU27 GDP down by 0.2%
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Appendix Table B, Panel B: Real-life news and detected credit events during the Global 
Financial Crisis 
 
 
 
Credit event 
date US News EU News
15-Dec-08
December 12, 2008: Industrial production down by 1.2% in both euro area and 
EU27
04-Dec-08 December 4, 2008: Euro area and EU27 GDP down by 0.2%
01-Dec-08
December 1, 2008: Federal Reserve will offer $150 billion in 84-day credit 
through its Term Auction Facility; 
20-Nov-08
17-Nov-08
November 17, 2008: Federal Reserve will offer $150 billion in 28-day credit 
through its Term Auction Facility today
November 17, 2008: Euro area external trade deficit 5.6 bn euros; November 
14, 2008: Euro area and EU27 GDP down by 0.2%
11-Nov-08
November 10, 2008: Federal Reserve will offer $150 billion in 17-day credit 
through its Term Auction Facility today; November 10, 2008: Federal Reserve 
Board and Treasury Department announce restructuring of financial support to 
AIG
05-Nov-08
03-Nov-08
November 3, 2008: Federal Reserve will offer $150 billion in 84-day credit 
through its Term Auction Facility today
31-Oct-08
October 31, 2008: Approval of the discount rate action of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta; October 30, 2008: Approval of the discount rate action of the 
Federal Reserve Banks of Philadelphia, Richmond, Minneapolis, and Dallas; 
October 29, 2008: Approval of the discount rate action of the Federal Reserve 
Banks of Chicago, Kansas City, and St. Louis; October 29, 2008: FOMC 
statement and approval of discount rate action by Federal Reserve Banks of 
Boston, New York, Cleveland, and San Francisco
27-Oct-08
22-Oct-08
October 21, 2008: Board issues statement concerning its approval of the 
proposal by Wells Fargo and Company to acquire Wachovia Corporation;  
October 21, 2008: Federal Reserve announces the creation of the Money 
Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF);  October 20, 2008: Agencies 
encourage participation in Treasury's Capital Purchase Program, FDIC's 
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program; October 20, 2008: Federal Reserve 
will offer $150 billion in 28-day credit through its Term Auction Facility today; 
October 22, 2008: EU27 current account deficit 30.9 bn euros
16-Oct-08
October 16, 2008: Written agreement with AmericasBank; October 16, 2008: 
Written agreement with Alliance Bancshares California
October 17, 2008: Euro area external trade deficit 9.3 bn euros
10-Oct-08
October 9, 2008: Statement on the efforts of Citigroup and Wells Fargo to reach 
an accord regarding the acquisition of Wachovia Corporation
08-Oct-08
October 8, 2008: Approval of the discount rate action of the Federal Reserve 
Banks of New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Richmond, Atlanta, Chicago, 
Minneapolis, Kansas City, Dallas, San Francisco, and St. Louis; October 8, 
2008: Board authorizes Federal Reserve Bank of New York to borrow securities 
from certain regulated U.S. insurance subsidiaries of AIG; October 7, 2008: 
Board announces creation of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) to 
help provide liquidity to term funding markets
October 8, 2008: Euro area GDP down by 0.2% and EU27 GDP stable
06-Oct-08
October 6, 2008: Approval of proposal by Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group to 
acquire voting shares of Morgan Stanley; October 6, 2008: Federal Reserve will 
offer $150 billion in 85-day credit through its Term Auction Facility today; 
October 6, 2008: Board announces that it will begin to pay interest on depository 
institutions' required and excess reserve balances
29-Sep-08
September 29, 2008: Federal Reserve and other central banks announce further 
coordinated actions to expand significantly the capacity to provide U.S. dollar 
liquidity; September 26, 2008: Federal Reserve and other central banks 
announce operations to address funding pressures 
17-Sep-08
September 19, 2008: Federal Reserve Board announces two enhancements to 
its programs to provide liquidity to markets; September 18, 2008: Federal 
Reserve and other central banks announce further measures to address elevated 
pressures in funding markets;   September 16, 2008: Federal Reserve Board, 
with full support of the Treasury Department, authorizes the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York to lend up to $85 billion to the American International Group 
(AIG)  
September 17, 2008: Euro area external trade deficit 2.3 bn euros
28-Mar-08
March 28, 2008: Federal Reserve will offer $50 billion in 28-day credit through 
its Term Auction Facility on April 7 and April 21, 2008 ;  March 27, 2008: 
Federal Reserve announces public meetings on the notice by Bank of America to 
acquire Countrywide Financial 
17-Mar-08
March 17, 2008: Approval of the first discount rate action of the Federal 
Reserve Banks of Boston, Cleveland, Richmond, Chicago, Minneapolis, Kansas 
City, and San Francisco; March 16, 2008: Federal Reserve announces two 
initiatives designed to bolster market liquidity and promote orderly market 
functioning; March 14, 2008: The Federal Reserve is monitoring market 
developments closely and will continue to provide liquidity as necessary to 
promote the orderly functioning of the financial system; March 11, 2008: FOMC 
statement: Federal Reserve and other central banks announce specific measures 
designed to address liquidity pressures in funding markets
46 
 
